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3EDITORIAL NOTE
At the January 1977 meeting of its monthly Economic Seminar
series, the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco was honored
to present Prof. Franco Modigliani, Immediate Past President
of the American Economic Association. In his paper, Prof.
Modigliani developed some of the themes which he had first
covered last September in his AEA Presidential Address, "The
Monetarist Controversy - Or, Should We Forsake Stabilization
Policies?" The Bank was doubly fortunate to obtain, as seminar
discussant, Nobel Laureate Milton Friedman, who was serving
as Visiting Scholar at this institution during the winter term.
This supplement to the Bank's Economic Review contains Prof.
Modigliani's lecture, Prof. Friedman's reply, the discussion
between the two and a floor discussion - plus, as an appendix,
Prof. Modigliani's AEA Presidential Address. The seminar was
chaired by Dr. Michael W. Keran, Vice President and Director
of Research for the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco.
4The Monetarist Controversy
Discussion by Milton Friedman
and Franco Modigliani
Michael Keran: The challenge has been
made, and the discussant is prepared to respond.
Professor Milton Friedman, among his other
notable accomplishments, of which I am sure
you are all aware, is the Visiting Scholar at
our Bank.
We are honored to have him with us, and
to have him respond to Professor Modigliani.
Professor Friedman: I certainly agree fully
with Franco Modigliani's basic proposition,
that the differences that separate so-called
monetarists - a term which I try to avoid
using myself, because I don't like it - from
non-monetarists are entirely empirical rather
than theoretical; and I am delighted to have
Franco agree with me on this point. I believe
that the differences are empirical not merely
with respect to our judgments about the size
of parameters, but also with respect to our
judgment of the way in which policy is
formed, operates and develops.
That is not a difference in value judgments.
I disagree with Franco on that. I doubt
very much that there is any significant dif-
ference between him and me, for example,
on the value judgments we attach to unemploy-
ment and inflation. If there be any difference
in value judgments in this respect, 1 would
say that perhaps it is in the discount rate
which we use in judging future events relative
to current events. Perhaps there is a difference
in time perspective.
I have been impressed in the past, that
the most consistent difference that I could
discern between people who tend to favor
fine tuning, and people like myself who tend
to favor rules, is in the discount rate that
they use - a short versus a long perspective.
I agree, also, with Franco's final point:
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that steady-state inflation has negligible costs.
If you could have inflation at a steady rate,
it would not be worth paying much in the
form of adjustment costs to move back to a
different rate. The fundamental cost, as Fran-
co said, arises from unexpected deviations of
inflation from a steady rate. The major rea-
son for favoring zero inflation is that I believe
it is almost impossible to have a political
set-up which will be consistent with steady-
state inflation, unless that steady state is zero,
or close to it.
Now, let me go back to Franco's presiden-
tial address - both to express agreement and
disagreement with it. I may say that I've always
thought that Franco, insofar as you use these
terms, has always been a monetarist, in very
important ways. His famous 1944 paper cer-
tainly qualifies as a major element in the
so-called monetarist structure. But I must say
that in the presidential address he displays a
quality that I had never attributed to him:
a capacity for understatement. I am refer-
ring to his comment, where he is trying to
show how little difference there was, theoret-
ically, between the monetarist and non-
monetarist view (or the Keynesian and the
classical theory), that "fiscal policy was re-
garded as having some advantages - according
to the gospel of the General Theory." Or, on
the next page, that "there was a tendency
(among the early Keynesians) to focus on fis-
cal policy as the main tool to keep the
economy at near full employment" (underlining
mine). I suggest that if you examine the writ-
ings of the people involved in the dispute in
the 1950's or early 1960's, the difference was
far greater than that. But that is just quib-
bling.I can well understand that, while Franco is
delighted to agree so fully as he does, he
finds it somewhat unseemly to agree com-
pletely. Since there is nothing to disagree with
on the theoretical level, he does what we all
do when we try to differentiate our products;
namely, to set up straw men. In his address,
Franco sets up four straw men that I might
refer to briefly.
The first one is that he attributes to me the
view that "wages (are) in reality perfectly flex-
ible," and that the world is "competitive";
and he refers to my "modeling of the commo-
dity market as a perfectly competitive one."
I offer a challenge to Franco. I shall pay him
a quarter for any statement he can find in any
of my published works, in which I make those
explicit assumptions. To illustrate the basis
for my confidence, let me quote from my
presidential address in 1967, in which I said,
when describing the natural rate: "Many of
the market characteristics that determine its
level are man-made and policy-made. In the
United States, for example, legal minimum
wage rates, the Walsh-Healey and Davis-
Bacon Acts, and the strength of labor unions
all make the natural rate of unemployment
higher than it would otherwise be." That is
hardly a statement that is consistent with my
assuming perfectly competitive labor markets,
or homogeneous labor, or any of the rest.
The second straw man is his assertion that
I assume that "expectations must soon catch
up with the facts" that what we are dealing
with is a "fleeting response to transitory mis-
perceptions." Again, I quote from my earlier
paper, "How long •.. is 'temporary' ....
for unemployment? ... I can, at most,
venture a personal judgment based on some
examination of the historical evidence, that
the initial effects of a higher and unantici-
pated rate of inflation last for something like
two to five years; this initial effect then
begins to be reversed, and that a full adjust-
ment to the rate of inflation takes about as
long for employment as for interest rates,
say, a couple of decades." It is hardly
accurate to characterize that statement and
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that.explicit discussion of the time period as
assuming a very rapid, instantaneous and
immediate response. In those two respects,
again, I think these are differences that do
not exist, and that Franco is closer to me,
or I am closer to him, than he suggests.
The third straw man, which he emphasized
in his verbal statements, is an argument which
he described as my attempt to demonstrate
logically that monetary policy must be inher-
ently unstable. If that is the interpretation
that can be placed on my words, then I
expressed myself very poorly. That wasn't
the purpose for which I was making the
argument. The essence of my argument in that
paper was that the monetary authorities had
a monetary instrument with which they could
ultimately control only monetary variables,
such as the price level and nominal income;
that it is not possible to use monetary instru-
ments to achieve a real target, whether that
real target be the real interest rate or real
output or unemployment rate. It was not my
purpose to argue that you had dynamic in-
stability in monetary policy in the sense that,
if you changed the real target, you were
necessarily at a razor's edge in which you
were driven one way or the other. The purpose
of that argument - and I think it is a valid
purpose - was to suggest that monetary
policy is an appropriate and proper tool
directed at achieving price stability or a desired
rate of price change, but is not an appro-
priate tool for achieving a particular target
rate of unemployment. And I think that
argument still holds.
The fourth straw man - and here, in a
way, I join Franco in attacking what he
attacks - is the discussion in his paper
about the theory of rational expectations. I'm
sure Franco will be pleased to know that in
the past several years, in our Workshop on
Money and Banking at the University of
Chicago, my major problem has been battling
with the proponents of Box-Jenkins on the
one hand, and rational expectations on the
other. (FRANCO: It's the same at MIT.)
They are both marvelous ideas and goodtheories; but you know there is a tendency
to carry them much too far and convert them
into fads. So I agree with Franco on that
subject. Indeed, if he had had a chance to
read the later version of some of the material
about the natural rate hypothesis, in chapter
12 of my price theory book, he would have
discovered that I make some of the same
comments about rational expectations that he
does. He quotes some users of the theory of
rational expectations as asserting that errors
can only be short-lived and random; that they
must be serially uncorrelated. That is not a
valid implication of rational expectations, in
my opinion. That is a misinterpretation of
the theory of rational expectations.
Let me give you a simple example from
recent history. For about five years, the
futures price of the Mexican peso was decid-
edly below the current price. And every year,
while the Mexican government maintained
the price of the peso at 8¢ a peso, the people
operating in the futures market made an error
in the same direction. Anybody who sold the
peso short was bound to lose money. Did
that mean that those expectations were not
rational? Not at all. What it meant was
that every single year there was one chance in
four that the peso was going to go down 50
percent; and that meant that it was appropriate
for the future price to be 12Y2 percent below
the current price. And that continued for 4 or
5 years.
The fact that those errors continued year
after year was no evidence that the expecta-
tions were irrational. It was only evidence
that you were dealing with a phenomenon
extending through time. I do not believe that
rational expectations imply, in any way, that
there cannot be significant deviations of
expectations from experience for lengthy periods.
But now we get to where we really disagree,
and that is on the policy level. Franco
referred, in his verbal talk, and has discussed
in much more detail in his paper, the evidence
which {)ersuades him that monetary policy
should have been different than it was in the
period after 1974, and that a stable rate of
monetary growth is not an appropriate way
















1968 1972 1976some of this evidence absolutely baffles me.
He says that he has looked back over the
past and found that two periods of stable
monetary growth, but highly unstable economic
activity, were the periods from 1953 to 1957,
and 1971 to 1975. He said he formed that
judgment on the basis of four quarter changes
in the rates of monetary growth. Well, I have
prepared some charts, of which we have dis-
tributed some copies; and I believe that if you
look at Ml on your graph, you will find
it hard to believe that 1953 to 1957, and 1971
to 1975, are periods of especially stable mone-
tary growth. If you will look at the M2
graph (and I may say, as you know, that I
have always tended to have much more
confidence in M2 than in Ml), and if you
again check the same periods, from 1953-57
and from 1971-75, they are hardly periods of
the most stable monetary growth. I would
say that the period which shows the most
stable rates of monetary growth, in the sense
of deviations from the long upward trend
throughout there, is the period from 1961
through 1965 or 1966. If we take that period
(1961 to 1965-66), that is the period of rela-
tively stable economic development.
Modigliani: Is that 1961-65 a stable period?
Do you realize that Ml went from 1Yz percent
up to 7 percent?
Friedman: Of course; but they were pro-
ceeding along a steady path.
Modigliani: But what's the difference? You
are talking about the second derivative now.
Friedman: Of course I am.
Modigliani: Ah, the second derivative counts.
Well, that's a new theory.
Friedman: Excuse me, it is not a new
theory. We both agree that what matters is
the difference between anticipations and reali-
zations. And what we are talking about are
the deviations from anticipated rates of growth.
Modigliani: And you mean, in this period
everybody anticipated that there would be
acceleration, acceleration, acceleration?
Friedman: This is off the track; because
whether you take it about a trend or whether
you take it in absolute terms, in no way are
the years from 1953-57 or 1971-74 periods
that have a lower standard deviation than the
M2


















15period from 1962-65 or 1966. Absolute or
otherwise.
Modigliani: This is just a factual question;
so let's not argue until we have performed the
computation.I
Friedman: I just want you to do one more
thing. Take personal income, which, both in
my opinion and Franco's, is a variable that is
predominantly moved by the money supply,
and ask whether there is a significant differ-
I. Modigliani note (added in galley): The average absolute
deviation of the four-quarter change in Mj is found to
be .89 for the period 1962-6~ and .9~ if one adds 1966,
as compared with .72 and .74 respectively for "rela-
tively stable" periods used in my analysis, 1953 to
1957.2 and 1971 to 1974.2. I must add that in the
process of checking Prof. Friedman's conjecture I have
discovered that there exists another spell in which Mj
was roughly as stable as in the two periods I have
singled out, namely the period from the beginning of 1961
to the middle of 1964, for which the average absolute
deviation is .72.
Friedman note (added in galley): This is playing games
by picking periods. For 1963.3 through 1966, the same
length as Franco's second period, the average absolute
deviation is .55. For M2, it is .89 for 1971 to 1974.2
and .72 for 1962 to 1965. And I suspect none of these
differences is statistically significant in the light of samp-
ling fluctuations. In any event, little can be learned from
such brief periods in analyzing a phenomenon which
operates with a long distributed lag.
ence inthe relationship betweenthe movement
ofpersonal incomeand the movement of M2
in the later part of the period and in the
earHer parLTheone.strikingdifference isa
much deeper recession in 1954than yoU would
have expected from the monetary change.
Thatis a significantdifference.
I have. always interpreted that difference
(and Anna Schwartz and I did this in our
Monetary History).as.a reflection ofthe drop-
ping of the bond support program by the
Fed. That didn't really become effective until
1953, when, in one fell swoop, it demone-
tized a large volume of assets, namely govern-
mentbonds. As a consequence, the effective
money supply dropped much more sharply
in 1953, than the reported money supply.
That is the main discrepancy that I can find
in these pictures between the movements in
personal income and money. I calculated sep-
arate regressions for the earlier and later
periods, and again I cannot find any significant
difference in the regressions for the two
periods.
With respect to the relationship between
moving standard deviations of money and
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16income, I do not know whether Franco re-
ferred, in his Boston Fed paper, to the calcu-
lations of that kind that Anna Schwartz and
I made in our paper in the Review of
Economics and Statistics in 1963. We made
such calculations for a very long period. They
show a high positive correlation between the
instability of money, on the one hand, and
the instability of income, on the other.
Now I come to the next major point that
Franco raises about the alleged incompatibility
of the monetary movement with the economic
movement. He argues that you cannot possibly
explain the large price rise up to 1974 as
reflecting monetary growth. I don't have the
exact words here, but I think that is the
essence of Franco's contention.
Well, I made a little calculation. We both
agree that the price controls introduced in
197I altered the time pattern of recorded
price change. We would both agree that the
"true" inflation in 1972 and early 1973 was
larger than is shown by the numbers, and that
the "true" inflation in 1973 and 1974 was
less than is shown by the numbers, because of
the effects of first imposing controls and then
removing them. Consequently, I took the
whole period from the third quarter of 197I,
which was the quarter when price controls
were imposed (on August 15), to the fourth
quarter of 1974 (the peak of the rate of price
inflation). On average, consumer prices over
that period rose at a rate of 7.5 percent
per year.
In order to see whether monetary growth
can account for this, I have to allow for
the fact that there is, on the average, a 2-year
lag between changes in nominal money and
changes in prices. So I took the rate of
change of M2 from the third quarter of 1969
to the fourth quarter of 1972 - that is, I
pushed it back two years. The average rate
of change over that period was 9.2 percent;
Le., 1.7 percentage points higher than the rate
of inflation. On the average for a long period
that difference is about 3 percent. On the
average over a long period M2 will grow
at about 3 percent more than prices, to allow
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for real output growth. This time it is 1.7.
I believe there are two major factors which
contribute to the residual discrepancy of 1.3
percentage points between I.7 and 3.0. I have
no doubt that the oil crisis in late 1973
and early 1974, by making this country
poorer, raised the price level. I have variously
estimated that as having been about I Yz per-
cent. Spread that over the three years, and you
have about Yz a percentage point, per year.
The rest of the 1.3-percentage point discre-
pancy is obviously consonant with our theory.
We have always argued that if you shift
from one rate of monetary growth to a higher
rate, adjustment to that higher rate will
involve an increase in velocity, since the higher
rate of inflation makes the holding of cash
balances more costly and, as a result, it will
lead people to try to reduce their cash balances.
That shift in velocity is a once-for-all effect.
What this implies is that about .8 percent
per year over a three-year period, or 2.4
percent in all, was the extent to which the
quantity of money demanded fell as a result
of the higher interest rates and the higher
rates of inflation.
Let me interject that I may be carrying a
good thing too far. There is, of course, a good
deal of fluff in the relation between monetary
change and subsequent price change. My only
point is to demonstrate that there is nothing
about the price rise from 1971 to 1974 which
is not entirely consistent with earlier changes
in the quantity of money.
Now we come to the final question of
whether you should accommodate, as Franco
put it. And here it is hard for me to know
how to discuss that issue in brief compass.
My major difference of opinion with Franco
is in two respects: First, with his assumption
that he knows how to accommodate (or that
1 do, for that matter, or that anybody does);
and second, with the assumption that if in
fact you adopt a policy of accommodation,
Franco Modigliani will be twisting the dials.
I have increasingly (and this is a subject
on which I must say I've changed my views
over the years) become impressed with theneed for a positive science of politics, of
political science. All of us - Franco, myself,
and all the rest of us - have tended to
follow the attitude: Well, now, what we need
to do is to figure out the right thing. If
only we can tell them what the right thing
to do is, then there's no reason why able,
well-meaning, well-intentioned people should
not carry out those ideas. But then we dis-
cover, over and over again, that well-inten-
tioned, able people have passed laws, or have
established institutions - and 10 and behold,
they don't work the way able, well-intentioned
people expected or believed they would work.
And it isn't an accident that that happens.
It happens for very systematic, explicit reasons.
Suppose, for a moment, I were to buy all
of Franco's arguments. Needless to say, I
don't; but suppose I did. I may say I do
agree with him completely, at one point, when
he says that it would be a miracle if a steady
rate of monetary growth would achieve pre-
cisely the pattern of inflation and unemploy-
ment that he plots. But I believe it would
be an even greater miracle that Franco would
be in a position to push those dials. That
is because, once you adopt a policy of
accommodating to changes, there will be all
sorts of changes that he and I know should
not be accommodated, with respect to which
there will be enormous pressure to accommo-
date. And he and I will not be able to
control that. I have increasingly moved to the
position that the real argument for a steady
rate of monetary growth is at least as much
political as it is economic; that it is a way
of having a constitutional provision to set
monetary policy which is not open to this
kind ofpolitical objection.
But let me return to the question of whether
Franco, or I, knows how to accommodate.
He takes the obvious example - 1974. What
happened in 1974 was not that the Fed did
not accommodate; what happened was that
the Fed stepped hard on the brakes, toward
the middle of 1974. It is true that the Fed
had stepped somewhat on the brakes earlier
in 1973, and there was a slow-down in
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monetary growth in 1973; but there was a
much sharper slowdown in 1974. The charts
which show annual changes do not bring out
these points very clearly. It comes out much
more sharply in quarter-to-quarter changes.
At the time, I was arguing, along with Franco,
against the slowdown in mid-1974. We agreed
at that time, not precisely on what the right
policy was, but what the right direction of
policy was.
I have long been in favor, as you know,
of reducing the rate of monetary growth of
M2 to somewhere in the neighborhood of
3 to 5 percent; but I have always been in
favor of doing it gradually - precisely for
the kinds of reasons that Franco quite proper-
ly presents. What happened was that this was
not done gradually; it was done very violently.
I have no doubt that it reinforced the adverse
effect on the economy of the oil crisis, and
of the disturbances of that time.
But now, let's go back. Early in 1973,
M2 was going up at roughly 10 percent.
Would it have been desirable to continue at
10 percent? Would it have been desirable to
accommodate to the oil developments by
going to 13, 14 or 15 percent? Or where?
Franco tells us that what was desirable was
to increase the money supply enough to get
the unemployment rate up to 7 percent. Well,
now, I believe that's a terrible prescription.
It is a terrible prescription because I do not
believe that there is a very close relationship
between the unemployment rate and what you
do with the monetary growth. In addition,
I believe that the unemployment rate is a
very undesirable, unreliable criterion of policy.
I am persuaded that the ups and downs in
recent years have been affected at least as
much by changes in the Unemployment
Insurance Act, as they have been by the acts
of monetary policy. The very sharp rise in
unemployment in early 1975, from January to
March or April, owed at least as much to
the fact that in January of 1975 a new
arrangement for unemployment insurance came
into effect which doubled the benefit period
and widened eligibility, as it did to whatwas happening to monetary policy.
Let me go beyond the 1974 period. I sat
at the Federal Reserve Board with Franco in
the summer of 1975, and I remember very
well his arguing, at that time, for something
over a 10-percent rate of growth in MI'
Would that have been desirable? I don't
believe he would think so now. And I didn't
think so then; so at least we are in agreernent
on that - if not at the same time!
My point is that maybe he was right on
that particular occasion in 1974; but is there
any reason to believe that he or I, or anybody
else, can be completely right, year after year,
under these circumstances? I don't believe so.
And I believe that if you adopt a policy -
and this is where I say the political assump-
tions come in - if you adopt a policy
which assigns to individuals the discretionary
power to fine-tune, or to gross-tune (I don't
care) - but the discretionary power to move
things like the rate of growth of the money
supply or, for that matter, taxes; then politi-
cal forces are going to come into play, to
see that that power is used for purposes
other than those which either Franco or I
would approve.
Michael Keran: Professor Modigliani has a
couple of comments, before we open this to
general discussion.
Modigliani: I would like to react to just a
few points, to set the discussion on its right
path. First of all, I would like to say that
I would disagree completely that the differ-
ences between Milton and me, in the evaluation
of unemployment and inflation, have anything
to do with discounting. As a matter of fact,
in the work I'm doing now with Lucas
Papademos, we use zero discounting. The whole
point of the paper is to take into account
all future consequences of an action now. You
get some very fascinating results when you
take into account all future consequences of
an action. For example, even if the Phillips
curve is not vertical, the long run, not the
short Phillips curve is relevant for policy
purposes.
Secondly, he has made a few points that
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I think are minor, and I want to leave them
out; but I do want to plead guilty to two
points. Let me make the minor first, and the
major next. About rational expectations, I do
agree now that I was wrong in saying that
rational expectations implies non-serially corre-
lated errors. On the other hand, it is also
true that once you allow for serial correlation
then generally you also allow for some policy
influences, in many cases. One source of serial
correlation is long-term contracts; and this is
consistent with rational expectations. As soon
as you have long-term contracts, you do have
room for policy. So, in effect, you can't
have things both ways: if you insist there is
no room for policy, then you must really
rely, to a large extent, on non-serially corre-
lated error.
Now I come to the more serious difference:
namely, that I have presented a picture of
Milton believing in fast adjustments and in
perfect markets. I must confess that here I
was confronted with a contradiction between
what his words said, at various places, and
what conclusions he was drawing from them.
I looked at the conclusions, not at the fine
words. Now it seems to me that if indeed
it takes five years to dispose of unemployment,
then it is hard to believe thata policy-maker
can be so stupid that one would believe he
cannot do something to improve the situation.
It seems to me that if you believe the effect
of disturbances is fleeting, then you open the
room for policy actions even for the fairly
stupid policy-maker. I'm not talking about the
mean policy-maker; that's a separate issue, to
which I want to come later - but stupid,
plain stupid. This explains why I attribute to
him perfect markets -- not perfect labor
markets, but perfect commodity markets;
because when I try to understand the model
that is behind his conclusions, and make it
so that the conclusions really follow from it,
then I have to go back to marginal cost
pricing, and to the sort of situation where
workers withdraw from the labor force because
they are misled about real wages. And I believe
that is the essence of Milton's model, and Ithink it does require those kinds of assump-
tions to lead to his conclusions.
Now, being fleeting is different from being
perfect, because it has to do with how quickly
expectations are corrected. But it seems to me
that there are many things I do not understand
about Milton's view if he tells me those
markets do not adjust quickly, because Albert
Ando and I have concluded that monetarism
is the non-monetarist world in which lags
disappear. Because indeed, if lags disappear,
then you do get back to a classical world.
All that the classics say is correct. The price
mechanism does it all. So, if there are long
lags, then I cannot understand why we should
disagree about the effect of taxes, or about
the effect of many other things.
Now, just a word about the evidence. Money
first, and then personal income. I have drawn
the period on Milton's MI chart which I
have used in my paper, and for which I
said the money supply was "generally" within
one percent of the average. Well, please
compute it, and you will see that in the
period to which I referred as "stable," the
money supply hit a peak of just over 8
and a trough of just below 6.
I've used 3Yz years - from the beginning of
1971 to the middle of 1974. Then, when I
used output, I used the same period shifted
by one year; so I go from 1972 to the middle
of 1975. So for those 3Yz years, the money
supply is indeed quite stable, compared with
any other period. I defy you to find any
other period in which, for a period of that
length, you get that low level of variation2.
Sure, there is a little peak; but again, are we
really worried about the fact that for one
quarter the annual growth of the money
supply was 8 instead of 7? It seemed to me
that you should make it clear, now, whether
you really believe in this mechanical view of
the money mechanism. After we have agreed
about how things work, at the theoretical
level, now, all of a sudden, we get these
point estimates. It takes two years; a two-
year lag and exactly point input, point output.
2. Friedman note (added in galley): As noted above,
1963.3 through 1966 is such a period.
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TwO years later, boom! I must confess that
I lose touch with Milton the scholar, when he
comes out with this kind of evidence.
Friedman: You're shifting back from your
understatement, to your overstatement. I don't
have to believe in a precise point lag to
say, as a rough estimate, let's look what
happens. If we allow for a two-year lag, of
course it's a distributed lag.
Modigliani: If you talk about a couple of
quarters, point input, point output may be
all right; but with a two-year lag, you just
can't do that. You've got to show me what
kind of lag you have. I mean, you have to
run a regression over a long time, and show
me what happens.
Friedman: Well, you go ahead and make
that regression for as long a period as you
want; but, allowing for averaging out the
period from 1971 to 1975, you will find that
price reacts to money during that period in
the same way as it does in other periods.
Modigliani: Similarly, you will find the
same thing to be true for the period I have
referred to in 1953-57; and I think you will
agree that this period was stable. In contrast,
1961-65 was an unstable period. The money
stock was growing faster and faster; so that
certainly is not a period of stable growth.
Now, as for the question of personal income
which he shows in his charts, the answer is very
simple. In the period 1972-75 there was great
instability, which is disguised when you plot
money income. Prices were rising like mad.
Then the whole problem was that the Federal
Reserve wasn't providing enough money, and
so, naturally, money income didn't change in
the face of prices rising by 12 percent. So if,
instead of taking money income, you take
real income - which is what I measured -
you will see the great instability. And I'm
surprised that we need to discuss it, because
you've all lived it. So do you believe every-
thing was rosy and stable between 1972 and
1975? If you believe it, then I think you'd
better go back to school.
Friedman: But one of the things, Franco,
that I thought you and I agreed on, and thatI have written on extensively, is that we know
much more about the nexus between money
and money income, or nominal income, than
we do about the forces that cause the division
between prices and output.
Modigliani: This happens to be a point
of complete disagreement. I believe we know
equally much about both issues. I think our
knowledge of the price mechanism is uncertain
at the fringe. For example, if you forever
keep unemployment one quarter percent below
what it should be, will inflation explode? -
or would it stabilize? Those things we don't
know. But we do know that wages respond
to unemployment, and past inflation, with fair
regularity - with the coefficient of past
inflation not very far from one. There is an
extensive literature that explains why that
would be the case. This is perhaps the differ-
ence between a monetarist and a non-monetar-
ist, in the sense that, if you start from LM
and IS, a non-monetarist will stress real
output and will derive money output as a
result. Monetarists, instead, tend to go directly
to money income - and I think that is
misleading. Although in many cases it would
be all right, 1973-74 is not one of those
periods.
Now, let me finally say that, in this question
of looking at inflation as a function of past
growth of money, I think there are many
things wrong with what Milton said, but I
can't immediately tell you what the answers
would be. You want to stop in the middle
of 1974, because that's the period I'm talking
about. The explosion of prices was an explo-
sion, because the rate of inflation of say the
CPI went up from something like 7 to some-
thing like 13 from the second quarter of
'73 to the first of '74. And if anybody believes
that an explosion of prices of this sort can
be accounted for by these wiggles in the
money supply, well, he can believe anything.
I don't know just why you chose a two-
year lag. Maybe, if I were to choose three
years, I might get another answer. But I think
that anybody who looks at the evidence must
conclude that what happened in 1974 is pri-
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marily an explosion of prices, due to the
impact of food and oil; and the price controls
had been eliminated before this.
Furthermore, all the evidence I've seen
suggests that the price controls and wage
cOLtrols (and here I believe I agree with
Milton) had a very small impact. In fact, the
evidence suggests that controls had no effect
whatever on wages, and other evidence (some
from Bob Gordon, for instance) suggests that
it had a small effect on prices, and that it
washed out fairly quickly.
Now, I think we come back to the funda-
mental point. Milton says it is not a question
of values. Well, I don't know how you cut
this pie. You say that having trust in one's
government is a matter of value, or is a matter
of technique, or is a matter of empirical
estimates. I do not know. I have personally
no reason to believe that the United States
government (if you were talking about Italy,
it might be a different thing) is not able to
attract able people who are interested in the
common welfare and can do a good job.
And I believe that if you look at the quality
of the people that have, shall we say,
manned the Council of Economic Advisers,
I think that suggests the good quality of the
advice that is available to the President. If
the President wants to use bad advice, I can't
really imagine that he will be deterred by some
rule that says the money supply should grow
at a constant rate; he'll find some way of
getting around that. In the final analysis,
one has to use one's political activity to make
sure that public servants are doing the common
good - that their actions are in the public
interest.
I complain that the Federal Reserve does
not tell us its target. Why do I complain?
Because I have no way of telling if it is doing
a good job or not. That's why I want them to
tell us what their targets are - and not
necessarily money targets. I don't care about
money targets. They can do anything with
money, as long as they tell us what their real
targets are - and as long as they take the
blame when they do not hit the real targets.Now, that seems to me to be the fundamental
issue.
Do you want to deprive yourself of an
important tool to make our life better, because
th~reis sornedanger that,. in fact, the. p~ople
who are using the tool will be thieves, or
inefficient, or under pressures? I cannot
imagine the Council really being under pressure
of.any .specialinterest. I.think· they would
have an interest in the country; and I am quite
willing to say that they should be paid a wage
which is escalated on real national income.
It could go up one point for each one-point
rise in real income, and then go down three
points each time the inflation goes up. So,
you see, I have a very one-sided bias against
inflation.
Friedman: Franco, I agree that they should;
but tell me, what chance do you think there
is that such a method of payment would
ever be adopted? And why not? It is such a
sensible method; why should we deprive our-
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selves of such a sensible rule for compensating
our servants?
Modigliani: Well, I think that would be a
good idea; and, of course, when I look at
Our record, it seems. to me that·. I •. can·.see
some errors; and most of those were errors
not of the advice, but of not following the
advice.
I find relatively few cases of wrong advice;
but there are some. I do admit that I
would have been wrong in 1968. In 1968, I
underestimated the power of inflation - and
a number of us did; but I think that is pro-
bably the only case where I would really
acknowledge that I would possibly have given
wrong advice, and that would have been only
for a short while - by the way, I think
quite short - because I did catch on.
Michael Keran: I think this would be a
good place to widen the debate and ask for
questions. Who would like to raise the first
question?The Monetarist Controversy
Floor Discussion
Q: I would like to address a question as
follows: Suppose that from 1946 to 1976,
the actual and the expected rate of mone-
tary growth coincided at 5 percent. (M2)
Everyone knew that the money supply was
going to grow at 5 percent, and they
expected it, and so on. Let me ask each
of you: Would the standard deviation of
the following variables be greater, or less,
than it actually has been - unemployment,
real income, and prices.
F: Less, for all three.
M: Well, I have indicated my answer. My
answer is that, if we had had everything
else the same, including the Korean war
and the Vietnam war, then the answer is
"More." Distinctly more; especially if
you assume constant fiscal policy.
Q: But all we have been talking about is
monetary policy.
F: The assumption is that you would have
had the same set of tax rates, that you
would have had the same set of expenditure
programs, and that you would have resort-
ed more to borrowing from the market, as
opposed to printing money on the average,
over that period.
M: Could I make an additional point? I
actually have done a simulation of this
with a model, and that is exactly what
happened: you do get more variability. It
all depends on what other things you
adjust. If you eliminate all kinds of sources
of variation - if you smooth fiscal
policy -
F: No, no; don't do that.
M: If you don't do that, then you get more
variation.
F: Well, yes; but that shows what's wrong
with the model. Because this is the really
important insight of the rational expecta-
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tions approach, in my OpInIOn. However
good a model may be, such as Franco
describes, for a world in which you do not
have agreement between the actual and
anticipated rate of money change, that
model - the equations of that model -
would have been different in a world
where you do.
M: Now, let me answer this, because I think
it is fundamental. The exact answer is
that in my view - not only the model's
view, since sometimes I disagree with the
model; we fight, and I say you're stupid,
you know that isn't right - but it is my
view that the expected rate of money growth,
when you're talking about 5 percent, is of
absolutely no consequence. Nobody paid
any attention until Milton told them that
they should look it up. Nobody would
ever dream of looking at the money supply;
and they don't dream of doing it in other
countries, except after Milton goes there.
Obviously, if you told me that you announce
a 20-percent rate of growth of money,
well, then, people who are moderately
smart will react to this. But if you are
saying that the money supply is behaving
reasonably, then what is expected or unex-
pected makes absolutely no difference to
anyone.
Who looks at the money supply? What
merchant, what industry, looks at the
money supply?
F: Nobody. Who cares whether they look at
it?
M: Okay; but then what does the expected
money supply matter? If I don't look at
it, how can I expect it?
Q: It seems to me that there is one difference
between the monetarists and the non-
monetarists, which in a way is a valuejudgment - but perhaps not in the usual
sense of the term. And that is: that the
monetarists are more averse to risks than
non-monetarists. That monetarism is play-
ing a minimum risk role, while non-
monetarists like Franco are willing to take
risks.
M: I hesitate to accept this proposition,
because one of the reasons that makes me
very opposed to the money supply is that
I can conceive of situations where you
would get tragedies; and 1974 was one of
them. In another context, stubbornly in-
sisting on stable money growth is wrong
when we have just observed a great decline
in the demand for money.
F: Oh, no, we haven't.
M: That is another discussion that we can go
into later.
F: Currently?
M: Yes; over the last two years. Not M2,
butMJ.
F: Neither one. There is only a breakdown
in the bad demand functions that people
fit.
M: Well, what stability means is, of course,
one's judgment; but from any point I've
seen, M2 is quite stable, so we agree on
that. But Ml is quite unstable. In a situation
like this, if you continue on the stable
money supply, you could get bad effects.
That, by the way, applies equally - and I
didn't make this point before, but let me
make it now - when I said that I used
unemployment as a target and said it
should have been 7 percent, obviously
using one target is a convenient simplifi-
cation. You may have to use something a
little more complex than that, in any
policy decisions.
Secondly, the unemployment rate target
was not very good after 1975, because the
policy of that Administration was to create
a lot of unemployment and then make it
easy to be unemployed (doubling the period
during which people would be eligible for
unemployment insurance). A completely
nonsensical, contradictory policy. If you
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want to end inflation, you want unem-
ployment to be hard. And if you want to
make it easy, then don't use it to end
inflation, so that we have in the end the
wOrst of all worlds, in which we essentially
end up by wasting resources. By making it
easy to be unemployed, we didn't accom-
plish what we wanted to accomplish.
One other thing which bears on the effect-
iveness of stabilization policy: Before the
Sec.ond World War, unemployment fluc-
tuated more than it did after the war.
F: Of course, that's true. But again, that is
really evidence in favor of stable mone-
tary growth; because, before World War II,
you had of course the most extraordinary
instability in monetary growth, with the
quantity of money declining by a third,
from 1929 to 1933.
M: No, no, no - leaving out the Great
Depression.
F: But the money supply was more variable
before 1929, than it was after World War
II.
M: Which means that the stabilization policy
has stabilized the money supply, and that
is great! It is true, by the way; and it is
exactly what you would expect.
F: Now, be careful. You're going to go back
on your initial statement that we agree
in theory; because I -believe that is a
statement which it will be very hard to
defend on monetarist theory - or on any
theory.
M: The statement is: If I can use fiscal
policy, and it has an effect, then I can
stabilize the economy with less variation
in the money supply.
Q: I think my question follows the statement
you have just made. In the past, mone-
tary and fiscal policies, at times, have
been found to be at cross purposes with
each other. Suppose we do accept Professor
Friedman's proposition that the rate of
growth of money supply would be made
a part ofthe Constitution, and is known in
advance to be 4 percent, or 5 percent -
you can argue about the numbers. Then itfollows that all the economic policy and
the stabilization programs would be
addressed by fiscal policy; and, in fact,
money supply then would become a known
constant. What objection would you have?
You would have less to work with, in
terms of variability of money supply. But
you would have more discretion in doing
what you want to do with the budget, or
the taxes, to stabilize the economy.
Do you think it will yield finer tuning
than we have had in the past?
M: I think the answer to that is very similar
to saying that if you are very careful and
distribute the weight properly, you can
drive a car with three wheels. Does it
follow. however, that I should advise you
to do it?
It is exactly the same story. You are
removing one useful tool which permits a
blend. For instance, if there is a decline
in money demand (as might happen, for
instance, if we start paying interest on
demand deposits), in those circumstances,
if I am forced by your 4-percent rule,
I'll find myself having to cut off all
investment, possibly; or, alternatively, hav-
ing to cut off consumption.
If for some reason the demand for money
rises, I have to respond by policy which
forces me to reduce investment and increase
consumption. And why should I do that?
Why should I cut myself off? Exactly
like the guy on three wheels.
Q: Is this the same story that used to be
used to justify foreign exchange interven-
tion? The central bank knows better how
to equate the demand and supply for for-
eign exchange, and therefore they have to
intervene and offset the unwarranted
gyrations in the private sector. If you are
willing to argue that it takes the central
bank to stabilize the demand for money
in the monetary sector, you should argue
forfixed exchange rates.
M: First of all, I do argue for managed
exchange rates; but that's a different story.
I can't understand the twisting of certain
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things. Look, suppose the demand for
money declines by 10 percent; how do you
think the private economy adjusts? How
does it adjust?
The demand for money shifts, so that, at
a given interest rate and given income, the
demand for money is 10 percent less.
Q: In the short run, the interest rate is up.
M: And what else?
Q: Interest rates would adjust, in the short run.
M: In a short while, prices would rise 10
percent.
Q: They would?
M: There is no other adjustment.
Q: All the redundant money would be con-
verted into commodities instead ofbonds?
M: Given the circumstances, it is clear what
must happen in a short time is a rise
in the price level.
F: Well, let's not say in a short time; but
sooner or later.
M: In short order, in short order. Do you
like that?
F: Excuse me both of you; but I think
we are begging the real question. You
are begging the fundamental question of
how do you know there has been a decline
in money demand, and thus whether
you're going to do the right thing?
M: I abolish interest on demand deposits. Okay?
F: First of all, as you know, that is one of
the reasons I've never wanted to use MI.
I want to use M2.
Let's go back for a moment, because
you made a statement earlier that I think
is not right, and you won't want to stick
with it. I would warn all of you that,
whenever anybody resorts to analogies,
there is something wrong with the logic.
If you've got a good logical argument,
you don't need a three-wheeled car.
You will agree with the following pro-
position: that a policy of discretionary
movement in an instrument can lead to
worse results than stability in it, if there
is enough lack of correlation between the
actions taken and the actions that should
be taken, even though, on the average,those actions are in the right direction.
Therefore, to get your three-wheeled car
analogy really going, you have to demon-
strate that we know enough to be able to
take those discretionary actions which, on
the whole, are stabilizing, as opposed to
the errors which are destabilizing. The
basic empirical judgment on this score
which leads us to stable monetary growth
is the belief that we do not know enough
to do that. And that is true, even if you
leave aside for a moment the political
constraints. If you know there is a 10-
percent decline in the quantity of money,
you can offset it - of course! But what
you really have to demonstrate is that,
over time, you will in fact know enough
about such changes and will be able to
identify them soon enough, so that you
can make adjustments which, on the aver-
age, will do more good than harm.
I have observed over a long period of
time that whenever anything goes wrong
with monetary policy, the favorite excuse
of the monetary authorities is that there
has been an exogenous shift in the demand
for money. But that is only an excuse.
They don't know it in advance. If they
did, they wouldn't have to bring in that
excuse after the event. So what evidence
do you really offer that we know enough
so that we know how to handle that
fourth wheel to be more stable, rather than
less stable?
M: Well, this would get us pretty much
astray; but let me just give an indication.
First of all, I agree with you that, in
principle, fewer instruments could be
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working better. In principle, anything can
happen. And the actual question is: Are
these coordinated so that in fact they don't
work independently of each other? In
other words, does it happen that when the
Federal Reserve decides that you need an
expansion, the fiscal policy authority also
decides to have an expansion, and we have
a positive correlated error, when it wasn't
needed. If they are coordinated, this is
highly unlikely to occur. The other point,
of course, is that this is precisely why the
targets need to be coordinated; that is
precisely why I am against the independence
of the Federal Reserve, if defined as
independence of targets. I am completely
for independence of the Federal Reserve,
if understood as independence of tools.
Given the target, given the fiscal policy
which is now fairly clearly stated by the
Congressional and Administrative policy,
through the budget process - given those
targets, the Federal Reserve ought to have
the same target, not a different one; or
disagree with the target, if it wants to,
and have it changed. But once the target
is there, it ought to work for the same
target.
Michael Keran: There's an old Jewish pro-
verb which says that "When scholars disagree,
the public and the truth will both benefit."
I think this has been an excellent example of
that. I, for one, will look upon this as one
of the most enlightening seminars I have
attended. I hope you feel the same. And I
want to thank our very distinguished speaker
and discussant for a fascinating afternoon.
Thank you very much.